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LEGISLATING THE INCUMBENT OUT OF OFFICE.U NDER the English common law the officer's right or interest
in the office which he held was regarded as a property right,
an incorporeal hereditament., Largely because of the inher-
ent difference between the nature and incidents of the public office
at common law and those of the public office in this country, this
conception never gained general acceptance here.2 In a few cases,3
and particularly in the decisions of the courts of North Carolina,4
offices have been asserted to be the property of the rightful incum-
bent. In these decisions the officer's right has been regarded as less
absolute, perhaps, than that of BLAcIKS roNi's conception, but these
courts have insisted that it is none the less a property right. Never-
theless they have recognized the power of the legislature to abolish
an office5 and to decrease,( though perhaps not to abolish,7 the com-
pensation thereof during the term of the incumbent. They have
further limited the officer's property in the office and its perquisites
by recognizing his lack of power and authority to sell or assign the
office or to delegate to another the performance of its duties.8
A consideration of these limitations on the meaning of the word
"property" as a designation of the right which the lawful incum-
bent has to the office and the incidents thereof leads one to the con-
clusion that the value of the term as descriptive of the relation is
L Blackstone's Comm. 36. See article on Recovery of Salary by De Facto Officer, io
Mich. Law Rev. 291.
2Taylor and 'Marshall v. Beckham (1899), x78 U. S. 548; Conner v. Mayor of New
York (1851), 5 N. Y. 285; Donahue v. County of Will (z881), zoo Ill. 94; State v.
Henderson (ipso), 145 Iowa 657, 124 N. V. 767; State v. Hawkins (1886), 44 Ohio
St. 98. sog; State v. Dews (1835), R. M. Charlton (Ga.) 397.
3 Wavimack v. Holloway (84), 2 Ala. 31, 33. With regard to this case Justice
Sanford of the New York Superior Court, 4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. (2 Sanf.) 355, 370,
said, "In that case, this remark (that the right to exercise office is as much a species of
property as any other thing capable of possession) is rather a figure of speech than a
judgment, determining an office to be property. It was a strong mode of expressing the
right which one elected to an office has to hold and enjoy it, as against all intruders
and unfounded claims; which is as perfect a right, beyond doubt, as the title of any
individual to his property, real or personal. But the nature. of that right, and its
liability to control by legislative action, is quite a different thing."
Mayor and Aldermen of Memphis v. Woodward (1873), 59 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 499,
Soi; Dodd v. 'Weaver (855), 34 Tepo. (2 Sneed) 669, 670; Cameron v. Parker (2894),
2 Okla. 277.
4oke v. Henderson (1833), 15 N. C. 1, 25 Am. Dec. 677; King v. Hunter (870),
65 N. C. 603, 6op; Bunting v. Gales (1877), 77 N. C. 283, 285; Wood v. Bellamy
(1897), 12o N. C. 222, 227.
'Wood v. Bellamy (1897), 120 N. C. 212.
0 Cotten v. tllis (i86o), 52 N. C. (7 Jones) 545.
1 Cotten v. ]Ellis (x86o), 52 N. C. (7 Jones) 545.
8 Wood v. Bellamy (897), 12o N. C. 212, 217.
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practically destroyed by the exceptions or limitations, and that its
use in this connection is consequently unfortunate. It is rather sin-
gular that the inappropriateness of using this term to describe a
relation which, by his own definition, lacked so many, and bore so
few, of the characteristics of property as we commonly know it did
not occur to the learned justice9 who first announced the doctrine
in this country. That a term so inappropriate and so misleading
and which the courts of North Carolina recognized for so long a
time" should not have led to more frequent mistakes in constru-
ing the law. of officers than it did, is remarkable but fortunate. Ex-
cept for the instance furnished by the case in which the relation of
the officer to his office was first designated as that of the owner of
property and in which it was decided that the law-making body can-
not legislate an officer out of office without abolishing the office,"
only one or two instances of the deleterious influence of the term
on the law of officers can be found in the decisions of the courts
of North -Carolina. The most evident of these is a principle which
is the-natural corollary of that established in the case of Hoke v.
Hendersonv, i. e., that though the legislature may reduce the salary
of an office during the term of an incumbent, it cannot wholly
abolish it, as this would be doing by indirection what the court in
the Hoke case held the legislature could not do directly.12
When the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the case of Miat
v. tllington" refused to recognize the doctrine of property in an
office and therefore to deny the power of the legislature to remove
the officer without abolishing the office, and in so doing expressly
overruled the Hoke case, it seems that this case should have been
rendered incapable of further harm in this country as a precedent,
but that this has not been the result we shall attempt to show further
along in this article.
In general, as has been hereinbefore said, the doctrine that a pub-
lic office is the property of the lawful incumbent has found no sup-
port in this country. Our courts have been equally unanimous in
their refusal to accept the doctrine that on the election or appoint-
ment of a citizen to an office and his acceptance thereof, a contract
arises between him and the state which in a measure restrains the
9 Chief justice Ruffin in Hoke v. Henderson (i83), 15 N. C. r.
11 The officer's right to his office was regarded as property by the North Carolina
courts until 1903, when the case of Mial v. 1 llington (igoa), 134 N. C. x3, was decided
overruling Hoke v. Hendersbn and the North Carolina cases following it.
"Hoke v. Henderson (1833), 15 N. C. i.
11 Cotten v. E1lis (86o), 52 N. C. 545.
' (19o3), 134 N. C. i31.
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legislature from interfering with the office or officer.14 As a result
of these views as to the nature of the officers's right to office, the
legislature has been conceded practically unlimited authority and
control over offices, except in so far as their power is limited by the
constitution of the state where it is called in question. Many limi-
tations are placed on the power of the legislature in this respect by
the constitutions of the various states. The commonest of such pro-
visions are those which forbid the increase or decrease of the com-
pensation of an officer during the term for which he has been chos-
en, 1 and those which, prohibit a shortening or lengthening of the
term of office during the incumbency of one chosen to office before
the passage of the act.10 These and other less common constitu-
tional provisions17 accomplish what the North Carolina courts at-
tempted to do by decision. Although the prevalence of constitu-
tional restrictions of the sort mentioned above have occasionally
led persons who have examined the law hastily to regard these
limits as inherent characteristics of an officer's right to the office,
it is manifest that in the absence of constitutional restrictions the
legislature has absolute control over statutory offices and may abol-
ish them,' may change the salaries thereof by increasing, diminish-
ing of abrogating them,' 9 may lengthen or shorten the terms there-
of,20 may add to or take away from the duties either with or without
14 Newton v. Commissioners (879), oo U. S. 548, 559; Conner v. Mayor of New
York (852), 5 N. Y. 285, 296; City Council of Augusta v. Sweeney (187), 44 Ga.
463; Butler v. Pennsylvania (i85o), 1o How. 402; Commonwealth v. Bacon (1822),
6 Serg. & Rawle 322; Locke v. City of Central (1878), 4 Colo. 65; City of Hoboken v.
Gear (1859), 27 N. J. L. 265; Farwell v. Rockland (1872), 62 Maine 290, 299; Barker
v. City of Pittsburgh (1846), 4 Pa. St. (4 Barr) 49; Harvey v. Board of Com'rs (2884),
32 Kan. x5g; Loving v. Auditor of Public Accounts (i882), 76 Va. 942.
s Iowa Const., Art. V, sec. 9; Kansas' Const., Art. I, sec. I5, Art. III, sec. 23;
Illinois Const., Art. V, sec. 23.
"'This is accomplished where the Constitution prescribes the length of the time of
office. Iowa Const., Art. IV, sec. 2; New York Const., Art. IV, sec. 2; Michigan Const.,
Art. VI, sec. 2.
1 For citations to constitutional provisions of various sorts, see Stimson, Federal &
State Constitutions of the United States.
Is City Council of Augusta v. Sweeney (1871), 44 Ga. 463; Farwell v. Rockland
(1872), 62 Maine 296, 299; People v. Auditor (X838), 2 Ill. (I Scammon) 537; Prince v.
Skillin (88o), 71 Maine 361, 36 Am. Rep. 325; Bryan v. Cattell (2864), 15 Iowa 538;
Reid v. Stevens, (igio), 226 N. Y. S. 379, 70 Miscl. 177.
Is Butler v. Pennsylvania (185o), 10 How. 402; Commonwealth v. Bacon (82),
6 Serg. & Rawle 322; Farwell v. Rockland (1872), 62 Maine 296, 299; Barker v. City of
Pittsburgh (2846), 4 Pa. St. (4 Barr) 49, 51; Conner v. Mayor of New York (is5i), 5
N. Y. 285; County of Douglas v. Timme (2892), 32 Neb. 272; Harvey v. Board of
Com'rs (1884), 32 Kan. 259; Fredericks v. Board of Health (1912), - N. J. L. -, 82
Atl. 528.
SFarwell v. Rockland (872), 62 Maine 296, 299; Taft v. Adams (2854), 69 Mass.
(3 Gray) 126; State v. Ure (2922), - Neb. -, 135 N. V. 224.
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increasing or diminishing the salaries thereof," and all of these
changes may be made to take effect during the terms of the incum-
bents who were serving when the acts were passed as well as at the
close of such terms.
22
In the face of so many decisions conceding to the legislature such
a broad power over offices which that body has created, it is diffi-
cult to understand how. any further question ,of the right of legis-
lative control could have arisen. There are, however, a .few com-
paratively recent cases which have questioned the right of the law-
making body to legislate an incumbent out of office by abolishing
the office and in the same or a concurrent act re-creating the office
under a different name with substantially the same duties.23 If the
courts in these cases mean to assert that by abolishing the office
under one name and re-creating it under another no legislative in-
tent to remove the incumbent of the old office is exhibited, and that
consequently the incumbent of the old office becomes the incumbent
of the new for the remainder of his term, ,we agree that their inter-
pretation would be reasonable under certain statutes. But if they
mean to say, as they undoubtedly do, that, in the absence of limita-
tions imposed by the state constitution, the legislature has not the
power by a properly worded statute to remove an officer before the
end of his term and appoint or provide for the appointment of a
person to immediately succeed him, they are in error. If the power
to remove and appoint another without cause be conceded to the
legislature, it is clear that it can accomplish this result by a properly
worded statute abolishing an office under one name and re-creating
it under another. So long as the North Carolina courts took the
view that an office is the property of the lawful incumbent, they
were consistent, at least, in holding that the legislature could not
summarily and without cause remove an incumbent from office with-
out in good faith abolishing the office. The change in the current
of authority in that state caused by the overruling in Mial v. Elling-
ton
2I 4 of the case of Hoke v. Henderson and the later North Caro-
=
t State v. Dews (1835), R. Al. Charlton (Ga.) 397; Atty. Gen. v. Squires (1859), 14
Cal. x3; State v. Board of Com'rs (1899), 23 Mont. 250.
2Taft v. Adams (1854), 69 Mass. (3 Gray) x26; Commonwealth v. Bacon (iz8I),
6 Serg. & Rawle 322; Barker v. City of Pittsburgh (1846), 4 Pa. St. (4 Barr) 49, 51;
Conner v. Mayor of New York (1851), 5 N. Y. 285; State v. Dews (1835), R. M.
Charlton (Ga.) 397; Board of Com'rs (1899) 22 Ind. App. 60; Touait v. State (1911),
173 Ala. 453, 56 South 211.
=Malone v. Williams (1907), xiS Ten. 39o; State Prison v. Day (899), 124
N. C. 362, 32 S. . 748, 46 L. R. A. 295; Wood v. Bellamy (1897), 12o N. C. 212,
27 S. . 177.
24 (1903), 134 N. C. 131.
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lina cases following it - should have put an end to the use of those
earlier cases as authorities in the support of the principle of limited
legislative control over offices. This has not been the result, how-
ever, as is shown by the case of Malone v. Williams,2 decided in
19o7. In this case the court held that the legislature could not
abolish, during the term of the incumbent, an office which they had
created and in the same act re-create it under another name with
practically the same duties as it had borne before, and require it
to be filled by a special election. This amounts to saying that an
officer cannot be legislaied out of office, i. e., removed from office
by the legislature, unless the office is abolished with a bona fide intent
to discontinue it. The court referred to no clause of the constitu-
tion of the state which limited the power of the legislature over the
office in question, and there appears to be none having that effect.
In reaching its conclusion the court relied on certain Tennessee
cases 27 as authorities for the principle that an office is the property
of the lawful incumbent. Though certain loose statements to that
effect are found in the opinions in these cases, all that is really de-
cided by these cases is that the lawful claimant to an office who is
kept out of it by another claimant has a right thereto which may be
enforced2 8 in a civil proceeding29 and may sue and recover the sal-
ary which he would have received had he served.30 There is noth-
ing in the facts or opinions in these cases to indicate that anything
further was meant by these loose statements than simply to express
in an emphatic way the right which the lawful claimant has to the
office as against one who has intruded therein.
In Malone v. Williams the court lays great stress on the decisions
of the North Carolina court, on the question of an officer's right to
office, from Hoke v. Hendersoiv3 ' down to and including State Pris7-
on, v. Day, -3 2 , without mention, however, of Mial v. Ellington.33 And
_ State Prison v. Day (I899), 124 N. C. 362, 32 S. E. 748, 46 L. R. 295; Wood v.
Bellamy (7897), 12o N. C. 212; King v. Hunter (1871), 65 N. C. 693; Cotten v. Ellis,
(i86o), 52 N. C. (7 Jones) 545.
2 (1o7), zx8 Tenn. 390.
17Dodd v. Weaver (1855), 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 670; Memphis v. Woodward (1873),
59 Tenn.(x2 Heisk.)499, 27 Am. Rep. 750; Moore v. Sharp (rS96), 98 Tenn. 65, 38 S. W.
411; Nelson v. Sneed (1903), 112 Tenn. 36, 83 S. ,V. 789; Mahoney v. Collier (19o3),
112 Tenn. 78, 83 S. V. 672. See also Boring v. Griffith (1870), 48 Tenn. (i Heisk.) 456.
= Dodd v. Weaver (s855), 34 Tenn. (2 Sneed) 670.
23 Mahoney v. Collier (2903), 112 Tenn. 78; Nelson v. Sneed (r9o3), 112 Tenn. 36.
See also Boring v. Griffith (1870), 48 Tenn. (i Heisk.) 456; and Anderson v. Gossett
(1882), 77 Tenn. (9 Lea) 644.
Memphis v. 'Woodward (873), 59 Tenn. (22 Heisk.) 499, 27 Am. Rep. 750.
31 (1833), iS N. C. i.
" (i899), 124 N. C. 362, 32 S. - 748, 46 L. R. A. 295.
'3 (1903). 134 N. C-. 131.
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the court is correct in its conclusion that these decisions, with the
exception of the last, uphold the principle which it asserts in this
case. Thus the bad influence of these early North Carolina cases
continues.
As further authority for its stand the Tennessee court cites cer-
tain cases decided by the courts of Utah, Kentucky and Louisiana.34
In referring to these cases as authority the court overlooked the
fact that in all but one of them the decision against the power of
the legislature was based on the ground that the acts in question
were in contravention of certain provisions of the stat6 constitution
protecting the term of the officer.35 The court in Malone v. Wil-
liams made the same mistake with respect to a certain Tennessee
case which it cites in support of its conclusion14
A Utah case cited by the court in support of the principle asserted
in Malone v. Williams is undoubtedly correctly decided and at first
glance seems to uphold the Tennessee case.37  In this case the city
council of Ogden under legislative authority had created the office
of captain of police, and the relator before the court had been ap-
pointed thereto. Subsequently an ordinance was passed discharg-
ing the relator and (as was claimed) abolishing the office. Within
ten days thereafter an ordinance was passed making provision for
the same office and for the appointment of an officer to fill the
place. An officer was appointed under the second ordinance and a
dispute arose as to which of the two claimants was entitled to hold
the office. The Utah court held that the second ordinance was in-
valid and that the original officer was entitled to the office. In his
opinion Chief Justice BARTCH said, "An officer whose term is dur-
ing good behavior, or who can only be removed for cause, cannot
thus be legislated out of office." The statute delegating the power
to the city council to create the office and to provide for the appoint-
ment of an officer, also provided for the removal of such appointee
for cause. The Utah court's decision rested on an interpretation of
this statute and it construed the provision for removal for cause to
exclude removal summarily. Manifestly the legislative delegation
of power here bore much the same relation to the power of the
84 State v. Wiltz (1856), ii La. Ann. 439; Adams v. Roberts (1904), I9 Ky. 364,
83 S. W. 1035; Silvey v. Boyle (1899). 20 Utah 205, 52 P. 602.
3s State v. Wiltz (1856), 11 La. Ann. 439; Adams v. Roberts (9o4), i19 Ky. 364,
83 S. W. 1035. In both of these cases it was held that a constitutional provision fixing
the term of office prohibited the legislature from removing the incumbent therefrom
before the expiration of his term without in good faith abolishing the office.
" State v. Leonard (z887), 86 Tenn. 485, 7 S. ,%\Y 453.
3' Silvey v. Boyle (1899), 20 Utah 2o5, 52 Pac. 602. See also to same effect, Wilson
v. Mayor and Council of Dalton (i91o), 135 Ga. 240, 69 S. E. 163.
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council as a constitutional provision bears to the power of the leg-
islature.
Summing up, it appears that the conclusions of the court in Ma-
lone v. Williams are supported by the decisions of the court of
North Carolina alone. It is only fair to the Tennessee court to say
that its judgment in this case was largely based on other reasons
than those to which we have referred and there is consequently no
quarrel with the result reached therein. The doctrine and principles
of that case in respect to the law of officers, however, are entirely-
erroneous and are, and were, unsupported by any cases not over-
ruled in the jurisdictions in which they were decided. It is to be
hoped that the doctrine that the office is the property of the lawful
incumbent and that the power of the legislature to deal therewith is
limited by this principle will end with this case. The power of the
legislature over offices, as it is in general, is absolute except as lim-
ited by constitutional provisions, and the motive inspiring the legis-
lative act regulating an office should not be considered by the court"
unless there is a veiled attempt to avoid some constitutional re-
striction.
GORDON STONrR.
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: State v. Lindsay (1899), 103 Tenn. 625, 630.
